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Abstract. Choquet capacities have been used to represent decision makers’ beliefs in order to 
generalise the expected utility approach. Conditional capacities have to be defined for dynamic 
choice  situations  where  information  may  modify  the  decision  maker  future  beliefs.  Several 
updating rules have been proposed in the literature. We derive them from a general approach based 
on conditional Choquet expectations. Conversely, depending on the updating rule adopted, the 
conditional Choquet integral can take different values. Conditional Choquet Expected Utility are 
derived from axioms on preferences. However, it is now well-known in decision theory that if  
preferences  satisfy  simultaneously  dynamic  consistency  and  consequentialism  axioms  their 
representation  is  restricted  to  classical  Expected  Utility.  We  show  that  the  rule  proposed  by 
Chateauneuf, Kast and Lapied (2001) is the only one to satisfy dynamic consistency with a non-
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0. Introduction 
Various  fields  of  economics  (Insurance,  Finance...)  deal  with  dynamic 
choice situations under uncertainty. In such situations, probability distributions on 
the outcomes are not given and conditional preferences are dependent on the way 
that new information is integrated. For instance, an Expected Utility maximizer 
uses  a  probability,  i.e.  an  additive  measure,  to  represent  the  decision  maker’s 
beliefs. Furthermore,  Bayes’ rule is used to update her beliefs (Savage  (1954) 
when new information arrives. However, several works (notably Ellsberg (1961)) 
have questioned the ability of this model properly to describe human behaviour in 
front  of  uncertainty.  Indeed,  the  Expected  Utility  model  cannot  take  attitude 
toward uncertainty into account. This is why other decision criteria, called non-
expected utility models, have been axiomatized, notably the Choquet Expected 
Utility one (Schmeidler (1986,1989), Gilboa (1987)). This model uses a capacity, 
i.e. a non-necessarily additive measure, to represent the decision maker’s beliefs. 
In contrast with probabilities, several updating rules have been proposed to update 
capacities: Bayes rule, Dempster-Shafer rule and Full Bayes Updating rule are the 
most common. Different approaches can be adopted to deduce these rules.  
A first approach consists to use a systematic method. For instance, Gilboa 
and Schmeidler (1993) refer to the F-Bayesian method to derive that an optimistic 
decision maker will use Bayes rule  and a pessimistic decision maker  will use 
Dempster-Shafer rule. This method is completed by Horie (2006), who uses an a 
priori prescription to integrate new information. This is formalized by Horie’s G-
updating rule, in which the basic properties of Bayes rule, Dempster-Shafer rule 
and Full Bayes Updating rule are investigated, depending on the adopted partition 
of the state space.  
A second class of approaches consists to reduce the problem to the additive 
case by applying conditioning to the core of the capacity. Brüning and Denneberg 
(2002)  and  Denneberg  (2001)  generalize  conditional  expectation  for  additive 
measures by using the max-min additive representation of monotone measures. It 
allows  to  generalize  conditional  expectation  and  conditional  probability  to  the 
case of monotone measures. 
An other way to characterize conditional capacities is a decision theoretic 
approach.  This  consists  to  apply  a  set  of  axioms  on  the  decision  maker’s   3 
preferences  and  to  show  that  they  imply  such  and  such  a  rule.  For  instance, 
axioms  from  Nishimura  and  Ozaki  (2003)  imply  Dempster-Shafer  rule  and 
axioms  from  Chateauneuf  et  al.  (2001)  imply  a  mixed  rule  depending  on  the 
comonotonicity of information and of the payoffs . 
A  fourth  class  of  approaches  is  to  consider  that  any  definition  of  the 
conditional Choquet expectation implies a definition of the conditional Choquet 
capacity.  For  instance,  Lehrer  (2005)  postulates  several  axioms  on  conditional 
Choquet  expectations  and  deduce  corresponding  definitions  for  conditional 
Choquet capacities and Denneberg (1994) characterizes the Full Bayes Updating 
rule by means of the conditional Choquet expectation of a charateristic function. 
The first aim of this paper is to obtain all the mentioned above updating 
rules  with  the  same  tool.  We  follow  Denneberg’s  approach  and  define  a 
conditional  capacity  within  the  unified  framework  of  the  conditional  Choquet 
expectations of charateristic functions. We summarize our results in a tableau.  
Then our attention turns to decision theory and preferences representation 
by  a  criterion  that  is  a Choquet  integral.  Depending  on  the  updating  rule,  the 
conditional Choquet expectation is dependent on which updating rule is used. As 
a consequence, the way of updating Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) preferences 
have some implications on the dynamic properties which can be applied to these 
preferences.  For  instance,  Bayes  rule  allows  the  Expected  Utility  model  to 
maintain  dynamic  consistency  and  consequentialism.  This  makes  Savage’s 
criterion appealing in a normative sense. Indeed, it’s now well known (Hammond 
(1988), Machina (1989), Karni and Schmeidler (1991), Volij (1994), Sarin and 
Wakker  (1998),  Ghirardato  (2002),  Lapied  and  Toquebeuf  (2007))  that  non-
expected utility models are reduced to the Expected Utility model if these axioms 
are simultaneously satisfied. In other words, some of them must be weakened to 
take attitudes toward uncertainty into account. 
The  second  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  verify  the  dynamic  properties  of  the 
updating  rules  commonly  used  to  update  Choquet  Expected  Utility  (CEU) 
preferences.  More  precisely  we  want  to  determine  whether  these  rules  imply 
dynamic  consistency  and  consequentialism  or  not.  We  show  that  while 
consequentialism is usually satisfied, dynamic consistency is not, at the exception 
of Chateauneuf et al. (2001) that violates consequentialism.   4 
In  section  1,  we  adopt  different  definitions  of  the  conditional  Choquet 
expectations and deduce several updating rules. In section 2, we turn our attention 
to the dynamic properties of these rules. Section 3 concludes.  
 
 
1. Updating Choquet integrals 
Let S  be a state space with a finite number n  of uncertain states s S ∈ . An event 
is a subset of  S .  B S ∀ ⊂ , the event  \ S B  is denoted 
c B .  X  is an outcome 
space, i.e. a subset of  ℝ, and we denote by  { : }
n f S X = → R  the set of acts, or 
random variables. 
The  decision  maker’s  preferences  over  uncertain  payoffs  are  assumed  to  be 
represented by a Choquet integral (Chateauneuf (1991))  (.) I . In this model, the 
beliefs  are  represented  by  a  capacity  [ ] : 2 0,1
n ν → ,  i.e.  a  set  function  that 
satisfies  ( ) 1 S ν = ,  ( ) 0 ν ∅ =  and monotonicity with respect to set inclusion, i.e., 
, A B S ∀ ⊂ ,  ( ) ( ). A B A B ν ν ⊆ ⇒ ≤  
(1 /1 ) A B I  is the individual value given to 1A, i.e. payoff of 1€ if and only if event 
A occurs, conditional on the realisation of event B . Then:  
/ ( ) (1 /1 ) (1 /1 1) 1 ( / ) A B A B A B
B
s B I I d A B σ ν ν ∈ ⇒ = = = ≡ ∫ ,  
where  ( ) B σ  is the s-algebra generated by B  and, 
/ ( ) (1 /1 ) (1 /1 0) 1 ( / ) c
c
c c
A B A B A B
B
s B I I d A B σ ν ν ∈ ⇒ = = = ≡ ∫ . 
In Denneberg (1994) the conditional Choquet expectation was defined by: 
, , A B C S ∀ ⊂ ,       [1 – (1 /1 )] 0 A A B
C
I dν = ∫ , 
In Chateauneuf, Kast and Lapied (2001), the Choquet expectation was defined by: 
, , A B C S ∀ ⊂ ,      / ( ) 1 (1 /1 ) A A B B
C C
d I d σ ν ν = ∫ ∫ . 
Both  formulas  extend  the  implicit  definition  of  mathematical  (Lebesgue) 
expectation with respect to a probability. However, the equivalence doesn’t hold 
for non linear integrals. Therefore, we can consider three possibilities: 
(1)  / ( ) 1 (1 /1 ) A A B B
C C
d I d σ ν ν = ∫ ∫    5 
(2)  [1 – (1 /1 )] 0 A A B
C
I dν = ∫  
(3)  [ (1 /1 ) – 1 ] 0 A B A
C
I dν = ∫  
Neither  Denneberg  nor  Chateauneuf  et  al.  considered  the  general  case  with 
( ) C B σ ∈  but restricted their attention to C S = , for the first one, to B  and to 
c B  for the second authors. 
Furthermore,  1 0 A
C
dν = ∫ , can be interpreted in two different ways, which may 
differ depending on the measurable set C : 
 (a)  1 [ .1 ] A C
C S




1 [ ({1 } ) – ( )] ({1 } ) A A A
C
d x C C dx x C dx ν ν ν ν
+∞
∞
= ≥ ∩ + ≥ ∩ ∫ ∫ ∫  
 
Proposition 1.1
1. If conditional Choquet expectations  (1 /1 ) A B I  are defined by: 
, A B S ∀ ⊂ ,  
(4)  / ( ) 1 (1 /1 ) A A B B
S S
d I d σ ν ν = ∫ ∫  , 
then: 













(Bayes updating rule). 
If  1A  and  1B   are  antimonotonic  (i.e.  1A  and  1B −   are  comonotonic)  random 
variables, 
( )– ( )
( / )=










 (Dempster-Shafer updating rule). 
 
Proof.  By  definition  ( ) 1A
S
A d ν ν = ∫ .  Comonotonicity  of  1A  and  1B   implies 
A B ⊂  or B A ⊂ . For conditioning, consider the non trivial case where A B ⊂ . 
1 0
c c
A s B s A ∈ ⇒ ∈ ⇒ = , 
                                                 
1 The same result was obtained in Chateauneuf, Kast, Lapied (2001) under more restrictive 
assumptions.   6 
(1 /1 ) (1 /1 0)
c
A B A B s B I I ∈ ⇒ = = , 
then:  (1 /1 ) (1 /1 0) 0
c
A B A B s B I I ∈ ⇒ = = = .   
(1 /1 ) (1 /1 1) 0 (1 /1 0) A B A B A B s B I I I ∈ ⇒ = = ≥ = = . 
It follows that  / ( ) (1 /1 ) (1 /1 1) ( ) A B B A B
S
I d I B σ ν ν = = ∫  and relation (4) implies: 
( ) ( )
(1 /1 =1)= =









Antimonotonicity of  1A and  1B  implies 
c A B ⊂  or 
c B A ⊂ . For conditioning, 
consider the non trivial case where 
c A B ⊂ . 
1 1
c
A s B s A ∈ ⇒ ∈ ⇒ = , 
(1 /1 ) (1 /1 0)
c
A B A B s B I I ∈ ⇒ = = , 
then:  (1 /1 ) (1 /1 0) 1 c
c
c
A B A B B
B
s B I I dν ∈ ⇒ = = = = ∫ . 
(1 /1 ) (1 /1 1) 1 (1 /1 0) A B A B A B s B I I I ∈ ⇒ = = ≤ = = . 
It follows that  / ( ) (1 /1 ) (1 /1 1) [1 – (1 /1 1) ( )
c
A B B A B A B
S
I d I I B σ ν ν = = + = ∫  and 
relation (4) implies: 
( )– ( ) ( )– ( )
(1 /1 =1)= =
1 – ( ) 1 – ( )
c c c
A B c c
A B A B B
I
B B
ν ν ν ν
ν ν
∪
.                
Note that the same results hold for  (1 /1 0) ( / )
c
A B I A B ν = = .                          ■ 
 
The  general  case  where  1A  and  1B   are  not  comonotonic  nor  antimonotonic 
random variables cannot be solved by relation (4). Indeed, we would obtain one 
equation  for  two  unknowns:  (1 /1 0) A B I =   and  (1 /1 1) A B I =   which  are  not 
necessarily equal to 0 nor to 1 as in the two previous cases and cannot be ranked, 
in general, to compute the Choquet integral. 
 
Proposition 1-2. If conditional Choquet expectations  (1 /1 ) A B I  are defined by: 
, A B S ∀ ⊂ , 
(5)  / ( ) 1 (1 /1 ) A A B B
C C
d I d σ ν ν = ∫ ∫ , 
then, for  { , }











 (Bayes updating rule).   7 
 
Proof. First, consider definition (a). 
1 1 1 1 ( ) A A C A C
C S S
d d d A C ν ν ν ν ∩ = = = ∩ ∫ ∫ ∫ , 
/ ( ) (1 /1 ) (1 /1 )1 A B B A B C
C S
I d I d σ ν ν = ∫ ∫ . 
If C B = : 
(1 /1 )1 0
c
A B B s B I ∈ ⇒ = , 
(1 /1 )1 (1 /1 1) 0 A B B A B s B I I ∈ ⇒ = = ≥ . 
then:   / ( ) (1 /1 ) (1 /1 1) ( ) A B B A B
B













c C B = : 
(1 /1 )1 0 c A B B s B I ∈ ⇒ = , 
(1 /1 )1 (1 /1 0) 0 c
c
A B A B B s B I I ∈ ⇒ = = ≥ . 
then:  / ( ) (1 /1 ) (1 /1 0) ( )
c
c
A B B A B
B













Now, consider definition (b). 
1
0
1 ( ) ( ) A
C
d A C dx A C ν ν ν = ∩ = ∩ ∫ ∫ , 
If  (1 /1 0) (1 /1 1) A B A B I I = ≤ = , 
(1 /1 0) (1 /1 1)
0 (1 /1 0)
(1 /1 )
( ) ( )
(1 /1 0)[ ( ) – ( )] (1 /1 1) ( )






A B A B
I d
C dx B C dx







= = ∩ + = ∩
∫
∫ ∫ . 


























If  (1 /1 1) (1 /1 0) A B A B I I = ≤ = ,   8 
(1 /1 ) (1 /1 1)[ ( ) – ( )] (1 /1 0) ( )
c c
A B A B A B
C
I d I C B C I B C ν ν ν ν = = ∩ + = ∩ ∫ . 
Relation (5) yields the same results.                                                                      ■ 
 
Proposition 1-3. If the conditional Choquet Expectations  (1 /1 ) A B I  are defined 
by:  , A B S ∀ ⊂ ,  
(6)  [1 – (1 /1 )] 0 A A B
S
I dν = ∫ , 
then: 
If 1A and 1B  are comonotonic or antimonotonic random variables, 
( )
( / )=










 (Full Bayes Updating rule). 
 
Proof. First, suppose that  1A and  1B   are comonotonic random variables, then 
A B ⊂  or B A ⊂ . We consider the non trivial case where A B ⊂ . 
1 0
c c
A s B s A ∈ ⇒ ∈ ⇒ = , 
(1 /1 ) (1 /1 0)
c
A B A B s B I I ∈ ⇒ = = , 
then:  1 – (1 /1 ) 0
c
A A B s B I ∈ ⇒ = . 
(1 /1 ) (1 /1 1) A B A B s B I I ∈ ⇒ = = , 
1 – (1 /1 ) 1 – (1 /1 1) 0 A A B A B s A I I ∈ ⇒ = = ≥ , 
1 – (1 /1 ) – (1 /1 1) 0
c
A A B A B s A B I I ∈ ∩ ⇒ = = ≤ . 
It follows that 
[1 – (1 /1 )]




A B A B A B
I d
I I A B I A
ν
ν ν = = + = ∪ + =
∫
 
 and relation (6) implies: 
( ) ( )
(1 /1 =1)= =
1 ( )– ( ) 1 ( )– (A )
A B c c
A A B
I
A A B A B B
ν ν
ν ν ν ν
∩
+ ∪ + ∩ ∪
. 
Now, suppose that 1A and 1B  are antimonotonic random variables, then 
c A B ⊂  
or 
c B A ⊂ . We consider the non trivial case where 
c A B ⊂ . 
1 1
c
A s B s A ∈ ⇒ ∈ ⇒ = , 
(1 /1 ) (1 /1 0)
c
A B A B s B I I ∈ ⇒ = = , 
then:  1 – (1 /1 ) 1 – 0 c
c
c
A A B B
B
s B I dν ∈ ⇒ = = ∫ .   9 
(1 /1 ) (1 /1 1) A B A B s B I I ∈ ⇒ = = , 
1 – (1 /1 ) – (1 /1 1) 0
c
A A B A B s A I I ∈ ⇒ = = ≤ , 
1 – (1 /1 ) 1 – (1 /1 1) 0 A A B A B s A B I I ∈ ∩ ⇒ = = ≥ . 
It follows that 
[1 – (1 /1 )
– (1 /1 1) (1 /1 1) ( ) [1 – (1 /1 1)] ( )
A A B
S
A B A B A B
I d
I I A I A B
ν
ν ν = = + = + = ∩
∫
 
and relation (6) implies: 
( )
(1 /1 =1)=









.                                                             ■ 
   
Notice  that  the  same  results  hold  for  (1 /1 0) ( / )
c
A B I A B ν = = ,  and  that  the 
general case where  1A and  1B  are not comonotonic nor antimonotonic random 
variables cannot be solved by relation (6). 
 
Proposition 1-4. If conditional Choquet expectations  (1 /1 ) A B I  are defined by: 
, A B S ∀ ⊂ ,  
(7)  [1 – (1 /1 )] 0 A A B
C
I dν = ∫ , 
where  { , }
c C B B ∈ , then: 
(i)  if  .1C
C S
Xd X d ν ν = ∫ ∫ ,  
( )
( / )=










,    (Denneberg (1994)). 
(ii)  if 
0
– 0
[ ({ } ) – ( )] ({ } )
C
Xd X x C C dx X x C dx ν ν ν ν
+∞
∞













Proof. (i) The case where C B =  is Denneberg (1994) Proposition 2-2. Let us 
consider the case where 
c C B = .  
[1 – (1 /1 )]1 0 c A A B B s B I ∈ ⇒ = , 
[1 – (1 /1 )]1 1 – (1 /1 0) 0 c
c
A A B A B B s A B I I ∈ ∩ ⇒ = = ≥ ,   10 
[1 – (1 /1 )]1 – (1 /1 0) 0 c
c c
A A B A B B s A B I I ∈ ∩ ⇒ = = ≤ , 
then: 
[1 – (1 /1 )]





A B A B A B
I d
I I A B I A B
ν
ν ν = = + = ∪ + = ∩
∫
  
and (7) implies: 
( )
(1 /1 =0)=











(ii) We have: 
1 – (1 /1 ) 1 – (1 /1 1) 0 A A B A B s A B I I ∈ ∩ ⇒ = = ≥ , 
1 – (1 /1 ) 1 – (1 /1 0) 0
c
A A B A B s A B I I ∈ ∩ ⇒ = = ≥ , 
1 – (1 /1 ) – (1 /1 1) 0
c
A A B A B s A B I I ∈ ∩ ⇒ = = ≤ , 
1 – (1 /1 ) – (1 /1 0) 0
c c
A A B A B s A B I I ∈ ∩ ⇒ = = ≤ . 
If  (1 /1 0) (1 /1 1) A B A B I I = ≤ = , 
[1 – (1 /1 )] A A B
C
I dν ∫  
– (1 /1 0) 0
– (1 /1 1) – (1 /1 0)
1– (1 /1 1) 1– (1 /1 0)
0 1– (1 /1 1)
{ [( ) ]– ( )} [ ( ) – ( )]
( ) ( )
A B
A B A B








A B C C dx A C C dx
A C dx A B C dx






= ∪ ∩ + ∩
































If  (1 /1 1) (1 /1 0) A B A B I I = ≤ = , then 
[1 – (1 /1 )] A A B
C
I dν ∫  
– (1 /1 1) 0
– (1 /1 0) – (1 /1 1)
1– (1 /1 0) 1– (1 /1 1)
0 1– (1 /1 0)
{ [( ) ]– ( )} [ ( ) – ( )]
( ) ( )
A B
A B A B






A B C C dx A C C dx
A C dx A B C dx






= ∪ ∩ + ∩




Relation (7) yields the same results.                                                                      ■   11 
 
Proposition 1-5. If conditional Choquet expectations  (1 /1 ) A B I  are defined by: 
, A B S ∀ ⊂ ,  
 (8)  [ (1 /1 ) – 1 ] 0 A B A
S
I dν = ∫ , 
then: 
If 1A and 1B  are comonotonic or antimonotonic random variables, 
1 – ( )
( / )=













Proof. With the same method as in the proof of proposition 1.3, we have: 
- when 1A and 1B  are comonotonic random variables (A B ⊂ ), 
(1 /1 ) – 1 0
c
A B A s B I ∈ ⇒ = , 
(1 /1 ) – 1 (1 /1 1) – 1 0 A B A A B s A B I I ∈ ∩ ⇒ = = ≤ , 
(1 /1 ) – 1 (1 /1 1) 0
c
A B A A B s A B I I ∈ ∩ ⇒ = = ≥ , 
then: 
[ (1 /1 ) – 1 ] A B A
S
I dν ∫  
(1 /1 1) – 1 [1 – (1 /1 1)] ( ) (1 /1 1) ( )
c c
A B A B A B I I A I A B ν ν = = + = + = ∩  
 and relation (8) implies: 
1 – ( ) 1 – ( )
(1 /1 =1)= =
1 ( ) – ( ) 1 ( ) – ( )
c c c
A B c c c c c
A A B
I
A B A A B A B
ν ν
ν ν ν ν
∪
+ ∩ + ∩ ∪
, 
- when 1A and 1B  are anticomonotonic random variables (
c A B ⊂ ), 
(1 /1 ) – 1 0
c
A B A s B I ∈ ⇒ = , 
(1 /1 ) – 1 (1 /1 1) 0
c
A B A A B s A B I I ∈ ∩ ⇒ = = ≥ , 
(1 /1 ) – 1 (1 /1 1) – 1 0 A B A A B s A B I I ∈ ∩ ⇒ = = ≤ , 
then: 
[ (1 /1 ) – 1 ] A B A
S
I dν ∫  
(1 /1 1) – 1 [1 – (1 /1 1)] ( ) (1 /1 1) ( )
c c c
A B A B A B I I A B I A ν ν = = + = ∪ + =  
and relation (8) implies: 
1 – ( )
(1 /1 =1)=
1 ( ) – ( )
c





ν ν + ∩
.                                                                 ■   12 
 
Proposition 1-6. If conditional Choquet expectations  (1 /1 ) A B I  are defined by: 
, A B S ∀ ⊂ ,  
(9)  [ (1 /1 ) – 1 ] 0 A B A
C
I dν = ∫ , 
where  { , }
c C B B ∈ , then: 
(i)  if  .1C
C S
Xd X d ν ν = ∫ ∫ , 
1 – ( )
( / )=












(ii)  if 
0
– 0
[ ({ } ) – ( )] ({ } )
C
Xd X x C C dx X x C dx ν ν ν ν
+∞
∞
= ≥ ∩ + ≥ ∩ ∫ ∫ ∫ , 
( )– ( )
( / )=
( )









Proof. (i) When C B = : 
[ (1 /1 ) – 1 ]1 0
c
A B A B s B I ∈ ⇒ = , 
[ (1 /1 ) – 1 ]1 (1 /1 1) – 1 0 A B A B A B s A B I I ∈ ∩ ⇒ = = ≤ , 
[ (1 /1 ) – 1 ]1 (1 /1 1) 0
c
A B A B A B s A B I I ∈ ∩ ⇒ = = ≥ , 
then: 
[ (1 /1 ) – 1 ] A B A
B
I dν ∫  
(1 /1 1) – 1 [1 – (1 /1 1)] ( ) (1 /1 1) ( )
c c c
A B A B A B I I A B I A B ν ν = = + = ∪ + = ∩  
and (9) implies: 
1 – ( )
(1 /1 =1)=
1 ( ) – ( )
c c
A B c c c
A B
I







c C B = : 
[ (1 /1 ) – 1 ]1 0 c A B A B s B I ∈ ⇒ = , 
[ (1 /1 ) – 1 ]1 (1 /1 0) – 1 0 c
c
A B A A B B s A B I I ∈ ∩ ⇒ = = ≤ , 
[ (1 /1 ) – 1 ]1 (1 /1 0) 0 c
c c
A B A A B B s A B I I ∈ ∩ ⇒ = = ≥ , 
then: 




I dν ∫  
  (1 /1 0) – 1 [1 – (1 /1 0)] ( ) (1 /1 0) ( )
c c c
A B A B A B I I A B I A B ν ν = = + = ∪ + = ∩    13 
and (9) implies: 
1 – ( )
(1 /1 =0)=
1 ( ) – ( )
c
A B c c c
A B
I






(ii) We have: 
(1 /1 ) – 1 (1 /1 1) – 1 0 A B A A B s A B I I ∈ ∩ ⇒ = = ≤ , 
(1 /1 ) – 1 (1 /1 0) – 1 0
c
A B A A B s A B I I ∈ ∩ ⇒ = = ≤ , 
(1 /1 ) – 1 (1 /1 1) 0
c
A B A A B s A B I I ∈ ∩ ⇒ = = ≥ , 
(1 /1 ) – 1 (1 /1 0) 0
c c
A B A A B s A B I I ∈ ∩ ⇒ = = ≥ . 
- If  (1 /1 0) (1 /1 1) A B A B I I = ≤ = , 
[ (1 /1 ) – 1 ] A B A
C
I dν ∫  
(1 /1 1)–1 0
(1 /1 0)–1 (1 /1 1)–1
(1 /1 0) (1 /1 1)
0 (1 /1 0)
{ [( ) ]– ( )} [ ( ) – ( )]
( ) ( )
A B
A B A B








A B C C dx A C C dx
A C dx A B C dx






= ∪ ∩ + ∩




With C B =  relation (9) gives: 













c C B = , we have: 












- If  (1 /1 1) (1 /1 0) A B A B I I = ≤ = , 
[ (1 /1 ) – 1 ] A B A
C
I dν ∫  
(1 /1 0)–1 0
(1 /1 1)–1 (1 /1 0)–1
(1 /1 1) (1 /1 0)
0 (1 /1 1)
{ [( ) ]– ( )} [ ( ) – ( )]
( ) ( )
A B
A B A B








A B C C dx A C C dx
A C dx A B C dx






= ∪ ∩ + ∩





Relation (9) yields the same results.                                                                      ■ 
 
We  can  summarize  the  previous  results  in  the  tableau  below.  We  use  the 
following notations: 
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Dempster-Shafer's rule (DS): 
( )– ( )
( / )=











Full Bayesian Updating rule (FUBU): 
( )
( / )=











FUBU on conjugate capacity
2  (FUBU/C):  
1 – ( ) ( )
( / )=
1 ( ) – ( ) 1 ( ) – ( )
c c
c c c c
A B A B
A B
A B A B A B A B
ν ν
ν
ν ν ν ν
∪ ∩
=
+ ∩ ∪ + ∩ ∪
 
D-S on conjugate capacity (DS/C):  
( )– ( ) ( )– ( )
( / )=
( ) 1 – ( )
c c c c
c
B A B A B B
A B
B B






  (1)  (1)  (2)  (2)  (2)  (2)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
      (a)  (a)  (b)  (b)  (a)  (a)  (b)  (b) 
  C = B, 
B
C 
C = S  C = B, 
B
C 
C = S  C = B, 
B
C 
C = S  C = B, B
C  C = S  C = B, 
B
C 
C = S 
1A  and 
1B 
como 
Bayes  Bayes  FUBU  FUBU  Bayes  FUBU  FUBU/C  FUBU/C  D-S/C  FUBU/C 
1A  and 
1B  
antimo 
Bayes  D-S  FUBU  FUBU  Bayes  FUBU  FUBU/C  FUBU/C  D-S/C  FUBU/C 
Gen 
case 
Bayes    FUBU    Bayes    FUBU/C    D-S/C   
 
2. Dynamic consistency and Consequentialism 
Updating  rules  deduced  in  the  previous  section  are  applied  to  characteristic 
functions, but it can be also applied to all random variables (Kast and Lapied 
(1997)). Indeed, it’s proved that the Choquet expectation of any random variable 
comonotone has a unique decomposition into a non-negative linear combination 
of  Choquet  integral  of  comonotonic  characteristic  functions.  Moreover,  in  the 
CEU model, the utility  : u X → ℝ  is strictly increasing and so keeps the rank-
ordering. Therefore, all updating rules from section 1 can be applied to CEU, and 
not only to Choquet expectation. 
                                                 
2 With  ( ) 1 – ( )
c A A ν ν = .   15 
, B S ∀ ⊂  we note  B f  the restriction of an act  f  to elements of  B . We write 
B f g =  if  , ( ) ( ) s B f s g s ∀ ∈ = , and  c B B f f ≥  if  , , ( ) ( )
c s B s B f s f s ′ ′ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈ ≥ . A 
decision  maker  (DM)  is  characterized  by  a  class  of  conditional  preferences 
{ } B B S ⊆   .  We  note     the  unconditional  preference  relation.  B S ∀ ⊂ ,  B    
compares  acts  conditionally  to  event  B ,  i.e.  if  the  DM  is  informed  that  only 
s B ∈  can obtain.  B ≻  and  B ∼  are defined in the usual way. We assume that   
can be represented by a CEU function (Gilboa (1987)).  :
n V → ℝ ℝ  is a CEU 
form if there exist a real-valued function  : u X → R  which is continuous and 
strictly increasing and a unique capacity ν  such that  (.) V  is the Choquet integral 
of  (.) u  with respect to ν  such that  , ( ) ( ( ) ( )
n
S
f V f u f s d s ν ∀ ∈ = ∫ ℝ .  
More  generally, all elements of  { } B B S ⊆    have a CEU  representation
3 (and so 
satisfy axioms from Gilboa (1987)). For  #B l = , we note it  :
l
B V → ℝ ℝ.  B V  
uses the same utility  : u X → R  and the update from ν , denoted by  (./ ) B ν . In 
this section, we have to verify if the updating rules obtained in section 1 imply or 
not the following axioms.  
 
Axiom 1 (Dynamic consistency).  , , ,
n f g B S ∀ ∈ ∀ ⊂ ℝ  
      ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) c c B B B B B B V f V g V f V g V f V g ≥ ∧ ≥ ⇒ ≥ . 
Dynamic  consistency  means  that  if  the  DM  prefers  f   to  g   (or  is  indifferent 
between  f   and  g )  in  all  ex-post  situations,  then  she  prefers  f   to  g   (or  is 
indifferent  between  f   and  g )  ex-ante.  Such  a  definition  can  be  found  in 
Nishimura and Ozaki (2003), Grant, Eichberger and Kelsey (2005) and Kast and 
Lapied (2007).  
 
Axiom 2 (Consequentialism).  , , , ( ) ( )
n
B B B f g B S f g V f V g ∀ ∈ ∀ ⊂ = ⇒ = ℝ . 
Such a definition can be found in Ghirardato (2002). Suppose that an event  B  
occurs. Consequentialism means that the DM only considers outcomes on B . In 
other words, each conditional preference is only dependent on the information 
received. 
                                                 
3 This property is named ‘Sequential consistency’ in Sarin and Wakker (1998) and ‘Model 
consistency’ in Kast and Lapied (2007) and Lapied and Toquebeuf (2007).   16 
 
Note  that  our  set-up  implicitly  supposes  that  the  decision  maker  is  indifferent 
about the timing of the resolution of uncertainty because our axioms are defined 
on 2
n , and not for a given and fixed information structure. It is now well-known 
that in such a context dynamic consistency and consequentialism hold together if 
and only if the capacity is additive on 2
n , such that all elements of { } B B S ⊆    have 
an  expected  utility  representation  (Ghirardato  (2002),  Lapied  and  Toquebeuf 
(2007)). If the capacity is not necessarily additive, then we can maintain only one 
of these two properties.  
 
Proposition 2-1. Suppose that the class of conditional preferences  { } B B S ⊂    is 
represented by a CEU form  (.) B V . If the conditional capacity  (./ ) B ν  is given by 
a unique updating rule (B, DS or FUBU), then { } B B S ⊂    satisfy consequentialism. 
 
Proof.  Remark  that  , A B S ∀ ⊂ ,  A B ∩ = ∅  implies  ( ) 0 A B ν ∩ =   and 
( ) ( ) 0
c c A B B ν ν ∪ − = . Therefore, if the conditional capacitiy  (./ ) B ν  is given 
by  B,  DS  or  FUBU,  ( / ) 0
c A B A B ν ⊂ ⇒ = .  Hence  for  all  ,
n f g ∈ ℝ   and 
B S ⊂  such that  B f g = , we have  ( ) ( ) B B V f V g = . 
Note that the same reasonement can be apply to (FUBU) and (DS) on conjugate 
capacity. Therefore, FUBU, DS and B imply consequentialism.                          ■ 
 
Proposition 2-2. If the conditional capacity  (./ ) B ν  is given by B, DS or FUBU, 
then dynamic consistency does not hold between   and { } B B S ⊂   .             
 
Proof. To show that, it’s sufficient to find an example where dynamic consistency 
is violated for each rule. We suppose a state space  1 2 3 4 { , , , } S s s s s =  partitioned  
with first stage events  1 2 { , } B s s =  and  3 4 { , }
c B s s = . We also assume that there 
exists a unique capacity  [ ] : 2 0,1
n ν →  and a utility  : u X → ℝ . For simplicity, 
we assume that u  is the identity function. ν  is such that : 
1 ({ }) 0.25 s ν = ,  2 ({ }) 0.2 s ν = ,  3 ({ }) 0.2 s ν = ,  4 ({ }) 0.15 s ν = ,  ( ) 0.5 B ν = , 
( ) 0.4
c B ν = ,  1 2 3 ({ , , }) 0.7 s s s ν = ,  1 3 4 ({ , , }) 0.7 s s s ν = ,  1 2 4 ({ , , }) 0.7 s s s ν = , 
2 3 4 ({ , , }) 0.6 s s s ν = ,  1 3 ({ , }) 0.6 s s ν = ,  2 4 ({ , }) 0.4 s s ν = .   17 
 
Case 1. Bayes rule is not consistent with dynamic consistency. 
We assume acts  (9,6,9,6) f =  and  (6,10,6,10.5) g = . 
1 2 ({ }) ({ })
( ) 6 (9 6) 7.5 ( ) 6 (10 6) 7.6
( ) ( )
B B
s s




= + − ⊗ = < = + − ⊗ = . 
3 4 ({ }) ({ })
( ) 6 (9 6) 7.5 ( ) 6 (10.5 6) 7.6875
( ) ( )
c c B B c c
s s




= + − ⊗ = < = + − ⊗ =
. 
2 4 4 ( ) 6 (10 6) ({ , }) (10.5 10) ({ }) 7.675 V g s s s ν ν = + − ⊗ + − ⊗ = ,  
1 3 ( ) 6 (9 6) ({ , }) 7.8 V f s s ν = + − ⊗ = , hence  ( ) ( ) V f V g > . 
This last inequality is a contradiction to dynamic consistency. 
 
Case 2. Dempster-Shafer rule is not consistent with dynamic consistency. 
We assume an act h  s.t.  (6,11,6,9.5) h = . 
1
2
({ } ) ( )
( ) 6 (9 6) 7.5
1 ( )
({ } ) ( )
















 ∪ −   = + − ⊗ =   −    ∪ −  = + − ⊗ =   −  
( ) < ( ) B B V f V h ⇒  
3
4
({ } ) ( )
( ) 6 (9 6) 7.2
1 ( )
( ) < ( )
({ } ) ( )



















 ∪ −   = + − ⊗ =   −  ⇒   ∪ −  = + − ⊗ =   −  
 
2 4 2 ( ) ( ) 6 (9.5 6) ({ , }) (11 9.5) ({ }) 7.7 V f V h s s s ν ν > = + − ⊗ + − ⊗ =  
This last inequality is a contradiction to dynamic consistency. 
 
Case 3. FUBU is not consistent with dynamic consistency. 






( ) 6 (9 6) 7.36
1 ({ }) ({ } ) ˆ ( ) > ( )
({ }) ˆ ( ) 3 (16 3) 7.33






















( ) 6 (9 6) 7.2
1 ({ }) ({ } ) ˆ ( ) > ( )
({ }) ˆ ( ) 3 (15 3) 7


















   = + − ⊗ =   + − ∪  ⇒    = + − ⊗ =   + − ∪  
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2 4 2 ˆ ( ) ( ) 3 (15 3) ({ , }) (16 15) ({ }) 8 V f V h s s s ν ν < = + − ⊗ + − ⊗ =  
This last inequality is a contradiction to dynamic consistency.                             ■ 
 
Now we prove that the rule deduced in proposition 1-1 and noted CKL
4 implies 
dynamically consistent Choquet capacities. 
 
Theorem  2-3.  If  conditional  capacities  are  given  by  CKL,  then dynamic 
consistency holds between   and the class of conditional preferences { } B B S ⊂   . 
 
Proof. We assume that   is represented by a CEU form  :
n V → ℝ ℝ  such that 
the value of an act  1 ( ,..., )
n





( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) n i i j i j
i n S
V f u f d u x u x u x A ν ν + =
= −
= = + − ∪ ∑ ∫ , 
Note  that  the  utility  (.) u   keeps  the  rank-ordering  on  X   because  it  is  strictly 
increasing. Without loss of generality, we only consider in this proof elements of 
n
+ ℝ .  Consider  events  B   and 
c B   where 
1 ( ) k l k A B = ∪ =   s.t.  #B l =   and  
#





( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( )
l
n i i j i j h h k h k
i n h l
V f u x u x u x A u x u x A ν ν
+
+ = + =
= − =
= + − ∪ + − ∪ ∑ ∑ . 
Similarly,  the  CEU  of  an  act  1 ( ,..., )
n
n g y y + = ∈ ℝ   where  1 , i i i N y y − ∀ ∈ ≥   is 
given by 
1 1 1 1
2 1
( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( )
l n
n n
i i j j h h k h k
i h l
V g u y u y u y A u y u y A ν ν − = − =
= = +
= + − ∪ + − ∪ ∑ ∑ . 
Note  that  CKL  can  be  only  applied  when  information  is  comonotonic  or 
antimonotonic with the valued random variable. It implies that  ,
l l N ∀ ∈ ℝ  only 
contains acts comonotonic or antimonotonic with 1B  because other functions are 
not defined. For example, if  c B B f f ≥ , then conditional capacities on B  are given 
by Bayes rule because  f  is comonotonic with the characteristic function of  B . 
1,..., i n ∀ = ,  we  denote  by  i x   the  consequences  of  an  act  f   and  by  i y   the 
consequences of an act g . 
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Case 1. f  comonotonic with 1B  and g  comonotonic with 1 c B . 
In this case, we have  c B B f f ≥  and  c B B g g ≥ . Note that Dempster-Shafer rule and 






( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( / ) B l h h k h k
h l
V f u x u x u x A B ν + =
= −





( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( / ) c
l
c
n i i j i j B
i n




= + − ∪ ∑ , 
1 1
2
( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( / )
l
n
B i i j i j
i
V g u y u y u y A B ν − =
=
= + − ∪ ∑ , 
1 1
2
( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( / ) c
n
n c
l h h k h k B
h l
V g u y u y u y A B ν + − =
= +
= + − ∪ ∑ . 
If  ( ) ( ) B B V f V g ≥  and  ( ) ( ) c c B B V f V g ≥ , then  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) c c B B B B V f V f V g V g ≥ ≥ ≥  
and therefore  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( )), c c
c c
B B B V f V g B V g B ν ν ≥ + −  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). c B B V f B V f B ν ν ≥  
It follows that  
( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( )) c c
c c
B B B B V f B V f B V g B V g B ν ν ν ν + − ≥ + − . 
If  f  is comonotonic with 1B , then conditional capacities used by  ( ) B
S
u f dν ∫  are 
given  by 
( )
, ( / )
( )
A B






∀ ⊆ =   and  conditional  capacities  used  by 
( ) c B
S
u f dν ∫  are given by 
( ) ( )
, ( / )
1 ( )
c c A B B









If g  is comonotonic with 1 c B , then conditional capacities used by  ( ) B
S
u g dν ∫  are 
given by 
( ) ( )













 and conditional capacities used 
by  ( ) c B
S
u g dν ∫  are given by 
( )












∀ ⊆ = . 
Then, 
                                                                                                                                      






( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) B l h h k h k
h l
V f B u x B u x u x A ν ν ν + =
= −
= + − ∪ ∑  
1 1
2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) c
n
c c n
l h h k h k B
h l
V g B u y B u y u y A ν ν ν + − =
= +
= + − ∪ ∑  
and  





( ) ( ( ) ( ( )) ( / ) (1 ( ))
l
c
n i i j i j
i n





  = + − ∪ −






( ) ( ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )
l
n i i j i j l
i n




= + − ∪ − ∑  
  ( )(1 ( ))
c
B V g B ν −  
  1 1
2
( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( / ) (1 ( ))
l
l c
i i j i j
i
u y u y u y A B B ν ν − =
=
 
  = + − ∪ −
    ∑  
  1 1
2
( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )
l
n c
i i j i j l
i
u y u y u y A u y B ν ν − =
=











( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( )




B n i i j i j B
i n
l l h h k h k
h l
S
V f B V f B u x u x u x A










+ − = + − ∪











( )(1 ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( )









l l h h k h k
h l
S
V g B V g B u y u y u y A









− + = + − ∪






hence  ( ) ( ) B B V f V g ≥  and  ( ) ( ) c c B B V f V g ≥  implies  ( ) ( ) V f V g ≥ . 
 
Case  2.  g   comonotonic  with  1B   and  f   comonotonic  with  1 c B .  This  case  is 
similar to case 1. 
 
Case 3. f  and g  comonotonic with 1B .   21 






( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( / ) B l h h k h k
h l
V f u x u x u x A B ν + =
= +






( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( / ) c
l
c
n i i j i j B
i n










( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( / ) B l h h k h k
h l
V g u y u y u y A B ν + =
= +






( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( / ) c
l
c
n i i j i j B
i n




= + − ∪ ∑ . 
If  ( ) ( ) B B V f V g ≥  and  ( ) ( ) c c B B V f V g ≥ , then 
  (1 ( )) ( ) (1 ( )) ( ) c c B B B V f B V g ν ν − ≥ −  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) B B V f B V g B ν ν ≥ . 
Therefore,  
  ( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( )) c c B B B B V f B V f B V g B V g B ν ν ν ν + − ≥ + − . 




, ( / )
( )
A B






∀ ⊆ =    
 and conditional capacities 
c B  are given by 
   
( ) ( )
, ( / )
1 ( )
c c A B B


















( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( )




B n i i j i j B
i n
l l h h k h k
h l
S
V f B V f B u x u x u x A










+ − = + − ∪
















( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( )




B n i i j i j B
i n
l l h h k h k
h l
S
V g B V g B u y u y u y A










+ − = + − ∪
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hence  ( ) ( ) B B V f V g ≥  and  ( ) ( ) c c B B V f V g ≥  implies  ( ) ( ) V f V g ≥ . 
 
Case 4. f  and g  comonotonic with 1 c B . This case is similar to case 3.              ■ 
 
If consequentialism is also satisfied, then the capacity is additive and CEU model 
degenerates into an Expected Utility representation. But using CKL rule means 
that  the  conditioning  is  dependent  on  counterfactuals  outcomes,  hence 
consequentialism is violated.  
 
Proposition 2-4. If conditional capacities are given by CKL, then the class of 
conditional preferences { } B B S ⊂    does not satisfy consequentialism. 
 
Proof. Let  f  and g  be two acts such that  B f g = , where B  is an arbitrary event. 
Suppose that  c B B f f ≥  and that  c B B g g ≥ . Then, 
- because  f  is comonotonic with the characteristic function of  B , conditional 
capacity  (./ ) B ν  used by  ( ) B V f  is given by Bayes updating  rule. 
- because  g  is antimonotonic with the characteristic function of  B , conditional 
capacity  (./ ) B ν  used by  ( ) B V g  is given by Demspter-Shafer updating rule. 
It implies that  ( ) ( ) B B V f V g ≠ , hence consequentialism is not satisfied.               ■ 
 
3. Conclusion 
We  have  adopted  a  general  method  to  characterize  the  conditional  Choquet 
capacity.  Dynamic  properties  of  the  obtained  updating  rules  have  been 
investigated  and  we  have  established  a  link  between  the  representation  of  the 
conditional  Choquet  expectations,  updating  rules  and  preferences.  Bayes  rule, 
Dempster-Shafer rule and Full Bayes Updating rule imply consequentialism but 
do not imply dynamic consistency if the capacity is not necessarily additive. CKL 
rule is the only one which allows to maintain dynamic consistency while using a 
non-additive  capacity  and  so  to  ensure  dynamic  consistency  in  the  face  of 
ambiguity.    23 
An  other  interest  of  this  updating  rule  is  that  it  violates  consequentialism  by 
taking  attitude  toward  information  into  account  (Chateauneuf  et  al.  (2001)), 
because it integrates reactions to ‘bad news’ or ‘good news’.  
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